INTRODUCTION
It is public policy in all European countries to achieve a level of health that permits each citizen to participate gainfully in productive economic and social activities. This general goal is reflected in health systems that differ, each reflecting a national history distinct in its political background and culture. Each national system may also be influenced by geography, climate, religious principles and demographic characteristics of the population, but the greatest influence is national wealth and social inequity. 1 Health services, by themselves cannot compensate for the results of social inequity. But health services can influence health and, as part of the social system, can reduce the impact of social inequity on health.
Cross-national comparisons of health systems have a long history despite the difficulty in performing such studies. Data are often not comparable and there are few good measures of the impact of health services on health and methods of controlling for differences resulting from social, cultural, demographic and economic influences on health. 2 Moreover, these comparisons usually focus on global characteristics such as costs, financing and utilization of hospital and outpatient services. 3 ' 4 Although all European countries regionalize their systems, at least to some degree, 5 " 7 few studies have explored the role of primary care within the overall organization of each system.
Since there is evidence of concordance between the level of development of primary care, satisfaction of the population with its health system and various health indicators, 8 an understanding of cross-national 308 FAMILY PRACTICE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL differences in the organization of primary care may facilitate explanation of at least some of the differences in health and satisfaction among countries. The purpose of this paper is to describe several key financial and organizational characteristics of primary care in western European countries that are at similar levels of industrialization.
DATA
The countries in this analysis are part of the EC (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK), part of the group known as COST, or Co-operation in Science and Technical Research (Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland). As of November 1991 the COST countries also included Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Iceland, Poland and Turkey. Data were obtained primarily from publications derived of the OECD (Paris), 9 the PRB (Washington) 10 and EC projects with Spanish participation (Equipo CESCA" and Red EspafTola de Atenci6n Primaria 12 ). Recent efforts include the Interface study, 5 Eurosentinel, 13 the Referral study 14 and the International Classification of Primary Care in the EC. 15 Although individual data points for specific countries may be imprecise, the relative positions of the countries are likely to be accurate. Table 1 summarizes several major characteristics of the health systems and health indicators in 13 western European countries, Japan and the USA.
PRIMARY CARE WITHIN THE HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM
The most striking difference between European health systems and the system in the USA is universality or near-universality of health insurance. Eligibility for coverage of medical expenses is through a public plan, both in the sense of financing and regulation of services. 5A1617 Those not covered are mainly the more affluent members of society who may choose not to participate in public plans. Universal health insurance, however, does not guarantee effective and efficient care, as measured by improved health at the lowest possible cost. Health expenditures however measured (columns 8-10 in Table 1 ) are not well related to the major indicators (columns [4] [5] [6] . Most other studies have also found weak and inconsistent relationships between the level of supply of health services and health outcomes in developed countries. 18 For example, mortality from avoidable causes differs considerably in the absence of obvious explanations deriving from health system characteristics." 19 Standardized mortality ratios for these conditions are more than 110 for seven of 13 causes in Italy and Ireland, for six of these causes in Germany, and for four of these causes in Greece and Scotland. In contrast, mortality ratios are higher than average for only two of the 13 causes in England and Wales and for only one of the causes in France, Denmark and Belgium. Only in The Netherlands is the standardized mortality from preventable causes below average for all 13 causes. 18 These differences cannot be attributed to differences in characteristics of the overall health system. 18 ' 19 The satisfaction of the population with its system is shown in column 11 Table 1 , for those countries in which it has been studied. 20 - 21 The low public satisfaction in the UK may be a result of a style of practice that is viewed as paternalistic and unresponsive to consumers. 16 CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIMARY CARE WHO health policy in Europe emphasizes the need for a shift in the focus of health care in favour of primary care in the community, at home and at work, with less reliance on the hospital. This implies a substitution, wherever possible, without loss of quality, with ambulatory care, care delivered by a team of professional providers and self-care, family care and support by self-help groups. 22 In Europe primary care is synonymous with general practice and the latter term is used in the remainder of this paper since it is the term used in the countries in this analysis. General practice is primary medical care delivered by physicians or health professionals who assume responsibility for providing medical care not limited to an age group, a disease entity or organ system, or patient group. 17 General practice is a well-recognized medical specialty in Europe, with postgraduate training ranging from 3 years in Spain to 6 years in Finland. There is considerable variation in the ratio of general practitioners (GPs) and the proportion of GPs among all doctors, with Belgium and France at one extreme and Spain and The Netherlands at the other. Moreover, the distribution of all physicians and of GPs in each country is not uniform. In many countries, especially those with no defined practice population (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Switzerland) there tends to be much greater provision of health services in and around the cities. 24 As column 4 notes, there are countries where physicians do not relate to defined practice populations, that is, to a formal association between a regular physician or group of physicians and a population committed to using that source for care that is not limited to certain problems or type of problems. This characteristic, known as 'longitudinality' 23 means that the GP at least implicitly recognizes the existence of a formal or informal obligation to be the regular source of care for a defined population. The population served may be defined geographically, through some other group characteristic (such as an employment group), or by enrolment of individuals or families on their own volition. When the population is defined by a list of specific names of individuals in a population, the likelihood of a personal relationship between physicians and -o 50 .** J8 patients is greatest. This is the case in Italy, Portugal and Spain, where there is responsibility for a geographic area but patients are enumerated individually; the situation is similar in the UK, with patient lists, but there is more flexibility in the definition of a geographic area. Scandinavian countries, in contrast, define their populations geographically, with the primary care physician responsible for providing care to residents of an area, who are not individually enumerated on a patient list. There are differences, however, even within Scandinavia. For example, in Finland the relationship between individual patients and individual GPs is not strong, whereas in Norway patients in large urban areas have more freedom of choice of physicians and therefore more likelihood of a personal relationship. There are no restrictions on the choice of physicians in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Switzerland: the patients can 'shop' around even at each point of perceived need for services (with some limitation in Austria and Switzerland), and there is no responsibility for a defined geographic area.
Column 5 indicates the involvement of GPs in community activities, which combines work as a family physician and a public health officer. GPs in the Scandinavian countries (except Denmark), Portugal and Spain function in this way. A comparison of columns 4 and 5 suggests that countries with defined practice populations are more likely to have community involvement of practitioners, perhaps because they are more likely to know about community health problems and to become involved in addressing these problems. Equity of access across the population is more likely in these countries, with consequent reduction in the impact of the 'inverse care law'.
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Column 6 contains the primary care score, which takes into account some characteristics of primary care related to the overall system and to the mode of practice in seven of the countries on which it has been examined.
high public satisfaction with the health system (Tables  1 and 2) Column 7 presents the results of an international survey of national associations of medical schools. 23 General practice was the most preferred specialty in six of 28 countries (21%). Although this percentage was higher in west Europe (33%) than in other countries, there is variation within western Europe. As the table notes, internal medicine as the preferred specialty is found where the system relies on fee-for-service, whereas choosing general practice was related to payment by capitation or salary.
Thus despite the uniform emphasis on general practice, there are substantial differences between the countries in the role of primary care within the health systems.
The remainder of this paper focuses on three characteristics that are likely to be influential in explaining at least some of these differences. They are: the method of paying the practitioner, the role of GPs as gatekeeper and practice organization and workload. Figure 1 draws on the work of Evans 28 and Hurst 16 to classify general practice in Europe according to the methods of paying its GPs, as follows: (A) indirect payment of GPs by reimbursement of patients (often with cost-sharing); (B) direct payment of providers by global budgets and salaries in a vertically integrated system; and (C) direct payment of GPs by contracts (with GPs usually being independent contractors). A vertically integrated system means direct payment of providers mainly by salaries (as in the staff model HMO). A public vertically integrated system implies direct payment of providers from public funds (as in the US Department of Veteran Affairs). 16 The method of paying GPs varies both between and within financing systems. Within the different countries there are three main ways of remunerating GPs: fee-for-service payment (in which the procedure or item of service is the unit of payment), capitation (the level of which often depends on the age and morbidity characteristics of the practice population) and salary. These remuneration methods are not mutually exclusive. In the reimbursement model ('A' in Figure 1 ), fee-for-service is the way of payment. In the contract model ('C in Figure 1) , there is often a mix of fee-forservice, capitation and allowances (which are fixed payments for certain overhead costs, such as personnel and office expenses). Where payment modes are mixed, physicians are paid differently depending on the type of service rendered; for example, preventative services might be paid by fee-for-service in order to encourage them, whereas curative services might be paid by capitation. In the vertically integrated systems ('B' in Figure 1 ) health professionals are paid by salary. Cultural, social, political and professional factors influence the method of paying GPs. In the contract model the schedule depends on the power of GPs' associations and government interests; e.g. in Germany a revised fee schedule was implanted in October 1987 to give greater emphasis to the role of the family physician and to personal medical services; 29 in the UK a revised contract was implemented in April 1991 to introduce competition and to improve quality. 16 ' 30 The methods of remuneration may be related to other factors, such as the nature of morbidity in the population, social class distributions, professional ethics and medical technology. In Europe, in general there are good reasons for convergence on the public contract model. 16 The reimbursement model has difficulty in containing cost and the public vertically integrated model is vulnerable to failures of microeconomic efficiency. 16 ' 20 New methods of payment in European countries may help to control health costs, promote prevention and primary health care and provide more equitable distribution of health care. 
Payment of GPs

The Gatekeeper Function of GPs
The gatekeeper is a defined point of entry each time care is needed for a health problem. When GPs act as gatekeepers they are functioning as agents of their patients. 28 The implications of this role are considerable. Since specialty services and especially hospital services make the largest contribution to health care costs, all countries have an interest in reducing the likelihood of their occurrence. Thus primary care will be favoured wherever it is possible without sacrificing quality of care. Active gatekeepers also change the characteristics of specialty practice. When patients are able to consult directly with specialists without being referred, problems brought by patients are often vague and unrelated to any specific diagnosis. When primary care physicians screen patients before referring them to specialists, the incidence of true disease among patients seen by specialists is increased and the role of the specialist is more heavily focused on more differentiated and more severe diseases. 37 Table 3 summarizes the role of GPs as gatekeepers in Europe. The second column provides data from a recent study of direct referrals in Europe. 14 In this study, a direct referral includes referrals that resulted from a face-to-face encounter between a physician and a patient. It therefore excluded a substantial proportion of referrals (30% in The Netherlands and 88% in Germany 14 ) that occurred as a result of other types of encounters between patients and physicians. Access to a specialist through referrals is more frequent when the GP functions as a gatekeeper. Practitioners who were paid a fee for each service referred less than those in countries whose physicians were paid by capitation (Tables 2 and 3) . 24 However, this does not mean that the use of specialist services is less, since patients may go directly to specialists if there is no gatekeeper.
Some European health systems (e.g. Italy, The Netherlands and Spain) require referrals to be renewed each year after the initial referral, even if the patient has been in continuing care by the specialists during that time. Column 3 indicates the proportion of all Source: refs 5,14. *In Denmark in scheme 2 (7% of the population) the patient is free to choose between GPs and specialists (but is required to make a 50% contribution towards the costs of ambulatory treatment). In Ireland there is direct access to specialists for patients belonging to categories 2 and 3 (middle and upper class, 60% of the population). In Italy there is direct access to ophthalmologic, paediatric, dental, gynaecological and obstetric services; this is also the case for Spain, except no direct access to gynaecological services. b In Austria and Germany there is direct accessibility to all specialists providing ambulatory care; inpatient care is provided mainly after referral C A re-referral is defined as a referral for which the patient had been referred at least once in the previous 3 years.
referrals that are re-referrals, which included true rereferrals for new or recurrent problems as well as rereferrals made by administrative requirement. Despite the relatively high proportion of the latter in The Netherlands, 14 it has one of the lowest re-referral rates. High re-referral rates reflect a relatively strong position of specialists within a health system, since they are a means by which patients may be kept under the care of a specialist rather than being returned to the care of the GP.
The interval between the referral and the visit to the specialist (column 4) is another indication of the relative influence of specialists within a health system, since a short interval reflects ease of access to specialists. This interval is shorter in Hungary, France, Germany, Yugoslavia and Belgium-all countries that also had high rates of re-referral.
The role of the GP as gatekeeper to secondary care is associated with restrictions on consumers/patients (Table 2 column 4 and Table 3 column 1). GPs working in the five countries with no restrictions on consumers' choices of GP at the point of receipt of services (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Switzerland), have no gatekeeper. In these countries GPs were mainly paid in a fee-for-service manner (in Belgium and France by indirect payment, under a public reimbursement model) ( Figure 1 and Table 2 ). Both countries have a high number of GPs as measured by GP per population or by GP as percentage of all doctors (Table 2 columns 2 and 3) .
Practice Organization and Workload
Until early in the 20th century primary care was characterized by solo practice. 3S~40 Currently, GPs in most countries increasingly share their practices and facilities or work in health centres owned by the health insurance agency or government. Group organization enhances the likelihood of team work with non-physician personnel, since it removes the incentive to keep costs low enough to be competitive. French GPs, paid by fee for service in a reimbursement model, provide longer consultations, arrange more return visits, order more tests, prescribe more drugs and work longer hours (mainly waiting for patients) than their British counterparts, who are paid mainly by capitation and allowances in a contract model; they also keep poorer records and seldom delegate work. 31 However, GPs may vary more within nations than across countries. 14 Higher office workloads and shorter visits would be expected to characterize countries with larger populations per GP. In fact, there was little relationship between the ratio of population to GPs (Table 2 column 2) and either direct encounters or duration of encounters (Tables 2 and 4 ). However, home visits comprised almost half the total workload of Belgian and French GPs, countries with relatively low population:GP ratios. Home visits to the elderly (over age 75) in Belgium accounted for 78% of total direct encounters. 14 The content of home visits may differ from country to country. In The Netherlands, GPs are actively involved in providing obstetric care, with onethird of the deliveries taking place at home (and a quarter in clinics supervised by midwives or GPs). 3 The geographic distribution of GPs also influenced workload; both in the UK and in France, physicians practising in regions where there was a high concentration of doctors spent more time on each consultation than did their counterparts in regions where there were fewer doctors. 24 There were differences in the content of the consultations. 15 ' 31 ' 43 For example, the number of tests per 100 direct encounters ranged from 5.1 in the UK to 16.1 in Switzerland (Table 4 column 6) . 13 The mean number of tests requested for each tested patient also varied from 1.5 in the UK to 4.1 in Belgium (Table 4) . l3 DISCUSSION Despite the presence of universal health insurance in all European countries, there were marked differences in financing and gatekeeping arrangements that were associated with notable differences in practice characteristics. 5 Fee-for-service practice (as in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Switzerland) was associated with a reduced likelihood of a longitudinal relationship with patients as well as other important features of primary care, as reflected in the primary care score. 8 Medical students in countries characterized by fee-for-service reimbursement were less likely to indicate a preference for general practice rather than for internal medicine. Referral rates were generally lower in fee-for-service arrangements as were the number of direct encounters per week with patients (except in Germany, where the population per GP is large) (Tables 2 and 4) . Fee-for-service was also related to a greater extent of home visiting, perhaps as a means of competing with specialists in systems where there is no gatekeeper. 44 Fee for service also appeared to predispose to longer consultations with possibly more procedures, as well as more social conversation. 31 ' 42 The fee-for-service payment provides little pressure for an even geographical distribution of physicians. In France approximately one-third of all doctors practise in the Paris region, another third in the C6te d'Azur-Provence area, and the rest of the country contains the remaining third. 45 The use of computers solely for billing purposes (rather than for clinical or practice management) is also greater in feefor-service countries. Strong gatekeeper arrangements (and hence restricted freedom of choice at the point of need for service) is not necessarily associated with public dissatisfaction as noted by the high level of satisfaction in The Netherlands, and there is a greater probability of community involvement by GPs. Students were more likely to express a preference for general practice in such countries. The likelihood of home visiting tended to be less, perhaps as a result of the absence of a need to have a competitive edge over specialists. Gatekeepers also appeared to reduce the total number of visits per capita (Tables 3 and 4) . 44 However, gatekeepers are not characteristics of feefor-service countries and are not necessarily associated with reduced costs of the system (as is evident in the high cost of the system in The Netherlands). That is, the impact of gatekeepers alone in the absence of a consideration of mode of financing, appears to have uncertain impact on practice. These observations may have implications for the USA where such arrangements are being actively encouraged.
One important conclusion to be drawn from the data in this paper concerns the need for original research on the relationships between primary care financing, gatekeepers and organizational arrangements in primary care. The impact on health and costs of care of many of the characteristics noted in the tables of this paper is largely unknown and poses a challenge for future health services research, including that involving cross-national comparisons. 
